Organised behaviour and organised identity. by Ruggiero, Vincenzo
 1 







Key words: criminal enterprise, criminal partnerships, identity, repertoires of action, 
conflict, frame alignment. 
 
There is growing body of literature which offers reviews of the concepts 
of organised crime and political violence, while documenting the official 
efforts to address such concepts jointly and treat them as a single issue. It 
would be intriguing to investigate how members of organised criminal 
groups and violent political groups respectively react to such official 
efforts. In my own memory, when the ‘mafiosi’ happened to share a 
prison institution with members of the Red Brigades, they would steer 
away from those idealist Communists who got nothing out of killing. The 
former, when overcoming the disgust they felt in the presence of those 
who in their eyes adopted an incomprehensible political stance, and 
perhaps even a despicable sexual lifestyle, would simply suggest: “don’t 
make revolution, make money, you cretin!”.  The latter, in their turn, 
would deal with the former as one deals with yet a different version of the 
economic and political power against which they fought. Echoes of this 
are found in an example coming from Greece itself, where the Courts 
have attempted to term ‘common’ rather than ‘political’ the offences 
attributed to the Revolutionary Organisation November 17. 
 
The fact that organised crime is guided by material motivations and 
terrorism by political ones may be seen as irrelevant by official agencies 
pursuing the objective of degrading the ‘enemy’ whoever that might be. 
Therefore, the ceremonies of degradation, including the choice of an ad 
hoc vocabulary, may well serve the task, as the mad, the drug user and 
the terrorist constitute an undistinguishable mob in the face of which 
quibbling differences may just obstruct the criminal justice process.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to try and clarify a number of issues that we 
encounter when dealing with organised crime and political violence 
respectively. 
 
Professional crime and political violence 
 
Let us start with the hypothesis that organised political groups, in order to 
finance their activity, are often forced to resort to forms of serious 
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criminality. While such criminality may at times include drug trafficking, 
it is likely to be a general rule that political groups purporting to represent 
disadvantaged communities would avoid involvement in activities that 
might damage those very communities. Moralistic and Robin Hoodesque 
in their own self-perception, ideally, political groups will opt for ‘robbing 
the robbers’, namely the wealthy who are favoured by the exploitative 
system against which political action is addressed. Lucrative hold ups, for 
example, or kidnappings of tycoons, according to this logic, would be the 
preferred sources of financing for violent political organisations. But even 
when carrying out such financially rewarding exploits, are we sure that 
political organisations mimic their criminal organised counterparts? In 
order to answer this question it is necessary to identify some peculiarities 
of organised crime and political violence respectively.  
 
Conspiracies and enterprises 
 
There is confusion and eclecticism as to what exactly constitutes 
organised crime. There is also a tendency to avoid the problem of its 
definition, as if the obvious need not be defined. In a statement issued by 
the US President’s Commission on Organized Crime, it is stressed that, 
while there is acceptance and recognition of certain acts as criminal, there 
is no standard awareness as to when a criminal group is to be regarded as 
organized. ‘The fact that organized criminal activity is not necessarily 
organized crime complicates that definition process’. Descriptions range 
from ‘two or more persons conspiring together to commit crimes for 
profit on a continuing basis’ to more detailed accounts of what these 
crimes are. Organised crime can be simply equated with serious 
offending, although serious crime may be extremely disorganised. On the 
other hand, o.c. can be identified as one single, self-perpetuating, criminal 
conspiracy (US agencies in the 1960s). Organised crime is also seen as 
being constituted by ‘crime families’ and the notion of bureaucracy has 
been applied to such families, suggesting hierarchically structured groups, 
characterized by formal rules and consisting of individuals with 
specialized and segmented functions within the hierarchy. A few 
individuals and families, in the past, were therefore deemed to centralize 
and coordinate all organized criminal activities. 
 
Critics suggest that a credulous sociology was led to believe in the big 
conspiracy: The Organization. This sociology, ‘innocent of such notions 
as informal organizations and patron-client networks, fixed the 




While bearing these controversies in mind, I suggest that the best-known 
definitions of organized crime can be classified very roughly as follows. 
Some hinge on strictly quantitative aspects: the number of individuals 
involved in a criminal group is said to determine the organizational 
degree of that group (Johnson, 1962; Ferracuti, 1988). Organized crime is 
said to differ from conventional crime for the larger scale of its illegal 
activity (Moore, 1987). Some others focus mainly on a temporal variable, 
that is on the time-span during which illegal activities are conducted. The 
death or incarceration of a member of organized crime, for example, do 
not stop the activities in which they are involved.  
 
Criminologists who focus attention on its structural characteristics 
observe that organized crime operates by means of flexible and 
diversified groups. Such a structure is faced with peculiar necessities due 
to its condition of illegality. Firstly, the necessity, while remaining a 
‘secret’ organization, to exert publicly its coercive and dissuasive 
strength. An equilibrium is therefore required between publicity and 
secrecy that only a complex structure is able to acquire. Secondly, the 
necessity to neutralize law enforcement through omertà (conspiracy of 
silence), corruption and retaliation. Finally, the need to reconcile its 
internal order, through specific forms of conflict control, with its external 
legitimacy, through the provision of occupational and social opportunities 
(Cohen, 1977). 
    
Frequently, definitions of organized crime revolve around the concept of 
‘professionalism’: its members, it is suggested, acquire skills and career 
advancement by virtue of their full-time involvement in illegality. 
Mannheim (1975) only devotes a dozen pages of his voluminous treatise 
to organized crime. The reason for this may perhaps be found in his 
preliminary general statement, where it is assumed that all economically 
oriented offences require a degree of organization, or at least necessitate 
forms of association among persons. In this light, the term ‘organized 
crime’ should be applied to the majority of illegal activities.  
Other authors prefer to concentrate on the collective clientele of 
organized crime. This is therefore identified with a structure involved in 
the public provision of goods and services which are officially defined 
illegal. Organized criminal groups, in other words, simply fill the 
inadequacy of institutional agencies, which are unable to provide those 
goods and services, or perhaps officially deny that demand exists for 
them. The contribution of McIntosh (1975) is to be located in this 
perspective. She notes that organized crime is informed by a particular 
relationship between offenders and victims. For example, even the 
victims of extortion rackets often fail to report the offenders, less because 
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they are terrified than ‘because they see the extortionist as having more 
power in their parish than the agents of the state’ (ibid.: 50). It may be 
added that the victims may also recognize their ‘protector’ as an authority 
which is more able than its official counterpart to distribute resources and 
opportunities. 
    
The descriptions and definitions mentioned so far share a central element: 
they are, to varying degrees, related to the notion of ‘professionalism’. 
This seems to allow for an original approach to the subject-matter, 
because such a notion alludes to a plausible parallel to be drawn between 
organized crime and the organization of any other industrial activity. 
However, one crucial aspect which characterizes the crime industry is 
neglected. This is that the crime industry itself cannot limit its recruitment 
to the individuals who constitute its tertiary sector or middle 
management. In order for the parallel with the licit industry to be 
validated, it has to be stressed that organized crime also needs a large 
number of unskilled criminal employees. Professionalism and unskilled 
labour seem to cohabit in organized criminal groups, and their 
simultaneous presence should be regarded as a significant hallmark of 
organized crime. 
 
In my opinion, therefore, what connotes large criminal organisations is 
their internal division of labour, which transcends the technical skills of 
their members, displaying a social differentiation between those enjoying 
decision-making power and those devoid of it.  
 
Let me now give a provisional answer to the question posed above: even 
when carrying out financially rewarding exploits, are we sure that 
political organisations mimic their criminal organised counterparts? I 
would suggest that, even when committing serious crimes, political 
organisations cannot be assimilated to organised crime, but rather to 
varieties of professional criminality. In this type of criminality the 
distribution of roles, typically, is based on specific individual skills, while 
a relative collegiality presides over decision-making, so that the planning 
and execution of operations are enacted by individuals close or known to 
one another. On the contrary, contract killers or drug couriers working for 
large criminal organisations, for example, hardly know the identity of the 
final beneficiary of their acts. They may engage in a long-term career 
while ignoring the strategy, motivations, let alone the face, of their 
employers. 
 
Considering that some organised criminal groups do not limit their 
activities to conventional offending, some supplementary observations 
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are needed. Successful organised crime manages to establish partnerships 
with the official world, particularly with business people and political 
representatives. When unable to do so, it remains a form of pariah 
organised crime, operating in the underworld, and destined to exhaust its 
resources and energies within the restricted realm of illicit markets. 
Organisations leaping onto the overworld, by contrast, are required to 
adopt a business style, a conduct, a strategy and a ‘vocabulary of 
meaning’ helping them to blend in the environment receiving them. In an 
environment saturated with corruption, within the political as well as the 
economic sphere, organised criminals will learn the techniques and the 
justifications of white collar criminals, now their partners. They may still 
‘commute’ between licit and illicit markets, but their new status will force 
them to identify allies, sponsors, mentors and protectors. In brief, they 
will be required to develop the negotiation skills characterising an 
economic consortium or a political party. Even when groups, while 
operating in the official economy, find it opportune from time to time to 
use violence, this violence will still be inscribed in the ‘vocabulary of 
meaning’ belonging to political parties and competing economic actors. 
Killing, therefore, may become in this case part and parcel of the 
negotiation process.  
 
Political violence and criminology  
 
Looking at the work we have inherited from the founding fathers, it 
comes as no surprise that political violence was central to the analytical 
efforts of early criminology. Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, for 
example, dealt with ‘sedition’ and ‘crimes against the state’ respectively, 
and their analyses, which also addressed institutional violence, were 
triggered by the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth century. The 
Positive School, in its turn, was engaged in understanding the turmoil of 
1848, the violent events occurring during the Commune of Paris, as well 
as the attacks carried out by anarchists, revolutionary socialists and 
individual nihilists. Last but not least, Durkheim was compelled to 
differentiate between socialism as a ‘reasonable proposal for change’ and 
communism as an ‘abnormal programme of destruction’ (Ruggiero, 
2006).  
 
Moving to the current times, it seems that only after the events of 9/11 
has criminology resumed any specific interest in political violence, at 
least in its variant commonly termed terrorism. Thus: ‘Criminology can 
play a major role in helping us understand the aetiology of terrorist 
behaviour. Again, contributions in this area have thus far been limited, 
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but we are already seeing traditional criminological theories being 
applied to explain terrorism’ (LaFree and Hendrickson, 2007: 782).  
 
There are scholars advocating the application of criminological theories 
of ‘common’ violence to the analysis of political violence, who argue that 
both types of violence are directed to the achievement of goals. For 
example, both aim at extracting something from someone; moreover, at 
least by perpetrators, both are presented as the outcome of provocation by 
the victims. When institutional-anomie theory (value clash) is applied to 
the study of terrorism, this is described as a clash between supporters of 
primordial institutions against ‘a rootless world order of abstract markets, 
mass politics, and a debased, sacrilegious tolerance’ (ibid: 26). 
    
From a different perspective, the suggestion has been made that the 
principles of situational crime prevention should also be applied to 
terrorism. According to this view, after identifying and removing the 
opportunities that violent groups exploit to mount their attacks, situational 
measures implemented through partnerships among a wide range of 
public and private agencies will assist with this task (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006). In other contributions the point is put forward that 
conventional crime is characterised by tensions and dynamics that 
underpins many forms of terrorism. Issues of shame, esteem, loss, and 
repressed anger, alongside the pursuit of pride and self or collective 
respect, which provide important tools to criminological analysis, may 
also help establish a taxonomy of terrorism. That criminological theories 
can migrate into the area of political violence is empirically probed by 
authors who apply a rational choice theoretical framework to a specific 
examples of political violence and terrorism.  
  
This notwithstanding, it is still appropriate to claim that most of the 
literature on political violence is produced by experts in political 
sciences, international studies and law. It is worth specifying, in fact, that 
most criminological studies available do not focus on political violence or 
terrorism, but rather on the official perceptions, the institutional responses 
to these phenomena, and the effects that such responses produce in the 
social and political sphere.  
    
It is not uncommon for criminologists to address the consequences of 
state intervention against terrorism, particularly in terms of human rights 
violation, its impact on civil liberties and policing, but also in respect of 
corporate and state crime. Themed sections of academic journals and 
professional magazines have also focused on ‘trading civil liberties for 
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greater security’, ‘anti-terrorism and police powers’, ‘terrorism and 
criminal justice values’ (Zedner, 2008).    
    
It may be contended that the state of criminology with respect to political 
violence is similar to the state once observed by Becker (1963: 166) with 
respect to gangs and juvenile deviance. ‘I think it is a truism to say that a 
theory that is not closely tied to a wealth of facts about the subject it 
proposes to explain is not likely to be very useful’. In other words, one 
may look at violent political actors with the same dissatisfaction with 
which Becker looked at young delinquents, and lament the paucity of 
information available around what they think about themselves and their 
activities. Some criminologists, perhaps stimulated by such paucity, have 
followed an alternative analytical route.  
    
Elements of criminological theories are used by Hamm (2007), who 
refers to Sutherland’s notion that criminal behaviour is learned through 
interaction and interpersonal communication. While Sutherland argued 
that the learning process involves specific techniques to commit crime as 
well as rationalisations for the crimes committed, Hamm supplements 
these with ‘a third element in a person who is willing to use it as a tactic: 
fanatical dedication to a cause’ (Hamm, 2007: 115).  
 
Rationalisations are intended by Hamm as ideology, therefore ‘the 
confluence of skill, ideology, and fanatical dedication has been the engine 
driving most terrorist groups throughout history’. Drawing on classical 
sociological thought, the author also introduces the variable charisma, 
that he applies to specific characters in the contemporary history of 
terrorism such as Carlos the Jackal and Osama bin Laden. Charisma, or 
the power of the gifted, is regarded as the fourth dimension of terrorism, a 
quality that elicits loyalty and unquestioned action. For charisma to 
express its strength, however, a crisis has to erupt in specific spheres of 
collective life. Charismatic leaders, therefore, are capable of responding 
to crises through their unique gifts, which may fall in the spiritual 
domain, in the economic arena or in the political sphere. ‘If the crisis 
involves political conflict, the gifts will be in the realm of oratory. And if 
that conflict leads to violence, the leader is likely to be gifted in military 
tactics’ (Hamm, 2007: 115). The author, however, mainly looks at 
‘terrorism as crime’ from a particular angle, as he is less interested in 
political violence per se than in the crimes committed for the provision of 
logistical support to that violence. His analysis, therefore, focuses on 
crimes aimed at providing terrorists with money, training, communication 
systems, safe havens, and travel opportunities. These crimes are seen as 
the ‘lifeblood of terrorist groups’, and include counterfeiting, bank 
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robbery, theft, fraud, kidnapping, espionage, drug smuggling, gun 
running, tax evasion, money laundering, cell phone and credit card theft, 
immigration violations, passport forgery, extortion, and prostitution. 
Hamm’s goal, therefore, ‘is to examine terrorists’ involvement in these 
crimes and describe law enforcement’s opportunities to detect and 
prevent them’ (Hamm, 2007: 3). In this way, one may opine, 
criminological theories are mainly applied to the analysis of ‘auxiliary’ 
common offences rather than precise political ones. 
 
Arena and Arrigo (2006: 3) claim that the extant literature ‘examines the 
causes of terrorism from within a psychological framework’. There is, in 
effect, an abundance of studies addressing violent political conduct as a 
function of the individual’s psyche, or even attempting to identify 
specific personality traits ‘that would compel a person to act violently’. 
This search for the terrorist personality, in reality, is a long-standing 
effort and echoes the analysis of Lombroso and Laschi (1890), according 
to whom individualistic political offenders (as opposed to revolutionaries) 
are characterised by ‘congenital criminality and impulsive instincts, 
which converge in a form of epilepsy associated with vanity, religiosity, 
megalomania and intermittent geniality’ (Ruggiero, 2006: 43). Arena and 
Arrigo suggest that the identity construct is too often deemed a 
contributing factor in the emergence and maintenance of extremist 
militant conduct, and while noting that knowledge around identity and 
terrorism is limited, they propose an alternative social psychological 
framework grounded in symbolic interactionism. The concepts utilised 





As I said earlier, organised crime may use violence as a supplementary 
tool of negotiating their presence on markets, or with the system. Violent 
political groups, on the contrary, use violence as a signal of their 
unwillingness to negotiate with a system they would rather demolish. 
Their action transcends the immediate result they achieve, and prefigures, 
realistically or not, a different set of achievements which will be valued 
in a future, rather than in the current society. Of course, some political 
groups may use violence as a supplementary form of pressure to 
accelerate a specific negotiation and pursue a concrete, material 
objective. But in this case, the word ‘terrorism’ becomes inappropriate, 
and such groups might be described as engaging in ‘armed trade 
unionism’. Are official governments prepared to do so? The ad hoc 
vocabulary of degradation, alluded to above, would prohibit it. 
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Finally, the evolution of organised crime into structures commonly 
described as networks may make comparisons between the two forms of 
violence increasingly far-fetched. Networks imply the alliance between 
highly heterogeneous groups and individuals, each with a distinctive 
cultural and ethnic background, who may establish common goals on an 
occasional or long-term basis. Actors operating in networks are socially 
‘fuzzy’, in the sense that their exploits and careers overlap with those of 
others who are apparently radically different from them. Networks are a 
reflection of  grey areas hosting diverse cultures, identities, values and 
motivations, areas in which the diversity of activities results from the 
development of points of contact, common interests and strategies 
between licit, semi-licit and overtly illicit economies. I am thinking of 
‘dirty economies’ consisting in encounters which add to the respective 
cultural, social and symbolic capital possessed by criminals, politicians 
and entrepreneurs, who interlock their practices. Networks, mobility and 
fluidity are metaphors that aptly describe the flows of people and groups 
engaged in some of the most successful forms of organised crime. 
 
Such forms of organised crime, in sum, see the participation of diverse 
collective or individual entities each pursuing their own goals in a style 
and against a set of values that are consistent with their own specific 
cultural, ethnic and professional background. As collective actors, 
participants display a form of organised behaviour without showing signs 
of an organised identity. Let us now shift to a set of considerations 
pertaining to political violence.  
 
Violent political groups do not pursue material gain, and when they do, 
this is related to the acquisition of symbolic status, namely a capacity to 
step up their propaganda and hence their visibility. Although criminology 
does provide analytical tools to deal with symbolic or expressive 
violence, there are other characteristics in political violence which make 
this specific conduct hard to locate within a criminological framework. A 
short overview of theories will help clarify this point. 
 
Anomie theorists may interpret the behaviour of armed groups as the 
effect of a lack of social integration and regulation, namely of cohesion, 
collective beliefs and mutually-binding constraints allowing smooth 
interactions. However, violent political groups claim to represent highly 
integrated and regulated groups, such as classes, political formations or 
religious communities. In other words, their lack of solidarity with the 
dominant social groups is counter-balanced by a high degree of solidarity 
proffered to what are deemed dominated groups, thus describing a 
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situation of anomie with respect to the former and one of strong 
normativeness with respect to the latter. In their case, therefore, it is not 
anomie, but its opposite, namely solidarity and integration that provide 
crucial preconditions for action.  
 
Adopting the concept of social disorganisation, it might be suggested that 
political violence is a possible solution to the dilemmas of exclusion and 
impotence. However, it should be noted that similar solution is embedded 
in a process of empowerment in which ‘boundary creation’ is paramount. 
All social relations occur within boundaries between those involved, and 
while at the individual level, these boundaries fall somewhere between 
you and me, at the collective level they fall between us and them. 
Boundary creation between us and them is crucial for the formation of 
identities, and in the case of social movements and groups it also involves 
the recognition of existing inequalities as unjust. The concept of 
disorganisation may explain ‘oppositional behaviour’, not ‘oppositional 
identity’. The latter involves identifying with an unjustly subordinated 
group, recognising the injustice suffered by that group, opposing it, and 
forging a collective identity of interest in ending that injustice. This 
implies a high degree of organisation and purposefulness, rather than 
aimless social disorganisation. While it is useful to explain dysfunctional 
processes and behaviours, it is also important to describe how some 
processes are functional to the promotion of shared consciousness, to the 
identification of collective interests and the building of organisational 
capacity to act on those interests. Political violence is one of the 
outcomes of such functional processes.  
In the perspective of learning theories, violent behaviour is transmitted in 
enclaves of peers and through mimetic processes triggered by role 
models. Learning opportunities, however, are accompanied by ‘claim 
making’ about social justice and the perception of viable ways of 
pursuing it. Such claims become political when groups and organisations 
holding means of coercion are addressed. On the other hand, 
strain theorists would posit that political violence is one of the possible 
deviant adaptations to an unsatisfactory situation. The impossibility of 
achieving goals through legitimate means, in this type of adaptation 
termed ‘rebellion’, is turned into the imagining of alternative goals and 
the promotion of alternative, including violent, means to achieve them. 
Rebellion, however, which implies a ‘genuine transvaluation’, namely a 
full denunciation of officially prized values, also includes a sense of 
frustration, a degree of resentment, and ultimately the perception of one’s 
impotence due to lack of resources. Although questioning the official 
monopoly of imagination, rebellion as described in strain theory remains 
anchored to a deprived social condition hampering the constitution of 
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alternative reservoirs of imagination. Such a reservoir, on the contrary, 
can be regarded as an important resource without which movements as 
well as violent political groups could not produce action. Resource 
mobilisation theorists, for example, suggest that availability of resources, 
rather than absence of them, makes groups capable of undertaking 
concrete action. Resources include material and non-material items, such 
as finances, infrastructures, authority, moral commitment, political 
memory, organisations, networks, trust, skills, and so on. In brief, while 
strain theorists tend to see social action as the result of a deficit, organised 
social action, whether violent or not, can also be interpreted as the 
outcome of a surplus. 
 
Political violence may be prevalent in contexts where control efforts 
eschew negotiation or accommodation, and are themselves characterised 
by violence. In this sense, the activity of some violent political groups 
could be understood as violence against the establishment, on the one 
hand, and as one of the effects of violence perpetrated by the 
establishment, on the other. If this relational dynamic seems to be 
successful in explaining political violence, conflict theory, which also 
contains relational elements, proves too general for the task. It is true that 
institutions do not represent the values and interests of society at large, 
and that norms of conduct may only reflect the norms of the dominant 
culture. But to state that political violence is a manifestation of two sets 
of norms violently clashing does not account for the fact that in most 
contexts, where also the norms of conduct only reflect the norms of the 
dominant culture, there is a negligible degree of contentious politics and 
political violence. The analysis of the specific context in which political 
violence occurs is crucial if the generalisations of conflict theory are to be 
avoided. The existence of repertoires of action, accumulated through long 
periods of conflict, is in this respect paramount. Repertoires consist of a 
legacy, made of cultural and political resources, available to political 
groups. They contain sets of action and identity deriving from shared 
understandings and meanings, they are cultural creations that take shape 
in social and political conflict.  
 
Some of the techniques of neutralisation identified in criminology may 
well describe the ideological process whereby violent political groups 
come to terms with the effects of their acts. The denial of the victim is 
operated through the perception of the victim as wrongdoer, the 
condemnation of the condemners through their  association with 
immorality, and finally the appeal to higher loyalties through the 
appropriation of the ideals and practices of one’s political or religious 
creed. Techniques of neutralisation, however, seem to belong to an ex-
 12 
post repertoire of motivations mobilised by offenders in order to fill the 
moral void they presumably experience. They are, in sum, a defensive 
device which may temper moral disorientation. Political violence, 
instead, combines defensive and offensive strategies, a combination 
without which action could hardly be triggered. Such strategies may 
include ways of overcoming a presumed moral disorientation, but must 
provide, at the same time, strong, unequivocal orientation for individuals 
and groups to act. This combination of strategies coalesce in the form of 
collective identity, which transcends pure role or group identity, in that it 
refers to shared self-definitions and common efforts towards the 
production of social change. Collective identity offers orientation in a 
moral space and gives rise to a sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy; it 
also prompts what is worth doing and what is not in organisational terms, 





Political violence, therefore, is one of the outcomes of organised identity 
and entails high degrees of subjectivity, so that some features of social 
life are no longer seen as part of misfortune, but of injustice. Along with 
techniques of neutralisation, political violence needs to elaborate an 
interpretive ‘frame alignment’ with the activists it intends to mobilise.  
 
Against the backdrop of control theories, political violence could be 
examined as the result of a lack of attachment, commitment, involvement 
and belief. On the contrary, most armed organisations possess all of these 
in exceeding measure. In turn, adopting ‘propensity event theory’ may 
prove problematic, as the violence of the organisation does not reveal a 
deficit in self-control and an inclination to impulsivity, but an extremely 
developed ability to postpone gratification (the perfect social system to 
come) and an equally patient capacity to plan actions.  
 
In brief, in political violence what is ‘organised’ is not crime or 
behaviour, but identity. And yet one may opine that organised crime and 
political violence could still be analysed jointly, because both require 
scientific investigations and interpretations of their structure, their 
internal make up, their external interactions, their targets and their 
changing physiognomy. The sociology of organisations, in this respect, 
could well be mobilised for such a joint examination. But this specific 
branch of sociology is certainly useful for the analysis of other 
organisations, for example, universities, companies, bureaucracies, and so 
on. Why then limit our joint analysis to organised crime and terrorism? 
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One could propose that, say, the next edition of the Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology contains a chapter on ‘Organised Crime and Universities’, 
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